

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Timothy Hunt and Dave Kupferer, Pantex Site Representatives
DATE: Friday, June 17, 2005
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Weekly Report

Tooling Tryout: Last week, during nuclear explosive operations, production technicians discovered that a lifting and rotating fixture could not be installed on an assembly cart. The fixture had recently been modified but had not gone through tooling tryout (TTO) before being sent to the line. Erroneously, tooling tryout was not identified as a required task on the work order that modified the tool. Although the fixture is *not* identified in the authorization basis as having a credited safety feature, tooling engineering had determined that it would benefit from going through the TTO process due to interfaces with other tooling. There were some discrepancies with the supporting documentation—e.g., the Design Requirements Document did not require tooling tryout—and the work order preparer failed to notice the tool was on the TTO list. Tooling Quality Assurance also missed an opportunity to verify that all inspection and test requirements were met prior to issuance. Production Tooling Support has subsequently implemented a peer review of all work orders.

Pit Repackaging: BWXT had requested support from both design agencies to conduct an engineering evaluation of the 2040 sealed insert (SI) repackaging process starting next week. The design agencies recently indicated that they cannot meet that commitment and the review schedule will likely slip a month or two. The completion of the evaluation and formal release to allow pit repackaging in 2040 containers to proceed is critical to BWXT meeting its fiscal year 2005 pit repackaging goals. In addition, SI pit repackaging drawings for two weapon programs were recently found to be incomplete and will need revising.

W62 Disassembly: While performing a procedural step to separate a part from a component, the component inadvertently separated from the unit. The *W62 Step II Hazard Analysis Report* identifies the possibility that the unit may come apart in this fashion and requires that, if it does, engineering be notified. The technicians stopped work and contacted appropriate personnel to evaluate. The previously used Step I procedure included contingency steps and tooling to recover from this situation, but they had not been incorporated into the Step II procedure. The component has been put aside pending disassembly of the nuclear explosive. An Engineering Instruction is being generated to complete separation and disposition of the component after disassembly and removal of the nuclear explosive from the facility.

Conduct of Operations: Manufacturing Division management issued a Standing Order this week that provides guidance related to more rigorous and involved oversight of conduct of operations. Key components described observation and assessment of work and conduct of critiques. The order gives details on the Nuclear Safety Officer's responsibilities in evaluating the implementation of, and adherence to, operational principles and providing technical support to production personnel. New requirements for when to hold critiques include the following: subsequent to all reportable or potentially reportable occurrences, tooling failures, units being placed in a safe and stable mode, unplanned events, procedural violations, and problems with the work procedure or authorization basis.